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CONFLICT OF LAWS-FOREIGN EXECUTORS AND AoMINISTRATORS-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NONRESIDENT MOTORIST STATUTE PROVIDING FOR JURISDICTION OVER PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES-Decedent was killed when his
car collided with another on a Missouri highway. Both the driver of the
second car and its owner, residents of Nebraska, were also killed. Decedent's widow brought a wrongful death action. in Missouri against the
Nebraska-appointed adminstratrixes of the estates of the driver and the
owner of the second car. Summonses were served on the Secretary of State
of Missouri in compliance with the Missouri Long Arm Statute which
specifically provides for service upon and jurisdiction over the administrators of the estates of nonresident motorists.1 The trial court overruled
defendants' motions to quash: On petition for writ of prohibition, urging
that the trial court had no jurisdiction, held, preliminary rule in prohibition discharged. The statute is a constitutional exercise of the police power.
The assumption of jurisdiction over the foreign administratrix of the
estate of a nonresident motorist involved in an accident in the state does
not violate due process. State ex rel. Sullivan v. Cross, (Mo. 1958) 314 S.W.
(2d) 889.
No jurisdiction over foreign administrators of nonresident motorists
may be obtained under nonresident motorist statutes not containing specific provision for such jurisdiction.2 For this reason twenty-two states have
recently amended their statutes to include within their scope jurisdiction

Mo. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1952; Supp. 1958) §506.210.
Two separate grounds may be found for these holdings. (1) The statute is in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed. See, e.g., Gregory v. White, (W.D.
S.C. 1957) 151 F. Supp. 761; Riggs v. Schneider's Exr., 279 Ky. 361, 130 S.W. (2d) 816
(1939); State ex rel. Ledin v. Davison, 216 Wis. 216, 256 N.W. 718 (1934). (2) The agency
for service of process is terminated by the death of the principal. See, e.g., Brogan v.
Macklin, 126 Conn. 92, 9 A. (2d) 499 (1939); Dowling v. Winters, 208 N.C. 521, 181 S.E.
751 (1935). See generally Culp, "Recent Developments in Actions Against Nonresident
Motorists," 37 MICH. L. REv. 58 (1938).
1

2
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over personal representatives. 3 Seven of the eight cases to date arising
under these statutes have upheld jurisdiction over the foreign administrator.4 While these amendments have successfully removed the previous
impediments to jurisdiction,5 attacks on their constitutional validity have
raised new questions. It is generally held that an administrator is immune
from suit in his representative capacity outside the state of his appointment.6 Some courts regard an action against an administrator as a proceeding in rem against the assets of the estate; hence, jurisdiction would
fail because the out-of-state court has no control over the res.7 More
often courts have held that because an administrator is an officer of the
court which appoints him, his ability to act is coterminus with the territorial limitations of the appointing court. Outside that area he has no
official standing.8 This rule of immunity has been used to invalidate
statutes which provide for general jurisdiction over foreign administrators.9 Its logical application in the principal case dictates the same result,

s Ala. Code (1940; Supp. 1957) tit. 7, §199; Ark. Stat. (1947) §27-341; Cal. Veh. Code
Ann. (Deering, 1948; Supp. 1957) §404; Fla. Stat. (1957) §47.29; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956)
§188.020; La. Rev. Stat. (1950; Supp. 1956) §13-3474: Md. Code Ann. (1957) art. 66½,
§ll5(f); Mass. Laws Ann. (1954) c. 90, §3A; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948; Supp. 1956)
§257.403; Mo. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1952; Supp. 1958) §506.210; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943; re-issue
1956) §25-530; N.M. Stat. Ann. (1953) §64-24-3; 62A N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1952;
Supp. 1958) §52; N.C. Gen. Stat. (1953; Supp. 1957) §1-105; N.D. Rev. Code (1943; Supp.
1957) §28-06ll; Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1958) §2703.20; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1953;
Supp. 1957) tit. 75, §1201; Tenn. Code Ann. (1956) §20-225; Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1950;
Supp. 1958) art. 2039a; Va. Code (1957) §8-67.1; Wis. Stat. (1957) §345.09; Wyo. Comp.
Stat. Ann. (1945; Supp. 1957) §60-1101.
4 Brooks v. National Bank of Topeka, (8th Cir. 1958) 251 F. (2d) 37; Feinsinger v.
Bard, (7th Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 45; Tarczynski v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 261
Wis. 149, 52 N.W. (2d) 396 (1952); Plopa v. DuPre, 327 Mich. 660, 42 N.W. (2d) 777 (1950);
Leighton v. Roper, 300 N.Y. 434, 91 N.E. (2d) 876 (1950); Oviatt v. Garretson, 205 Ark.
792, 171 S.W. (2d) 287 (1943). Contra, Knoop v. Anderson, (N.D. Iowa 1947) 71 F. Supp.
832. See also Derrick v. New England Greyhound Lines, (D.C. Mass. 1957) 148 F. Supp.
496, where it was held the statute did not purport to confer jurisdiction.
5 The argument based on strict construction is eliminated. The courts hold further
that such a statute is not limited by common law rules of agency. E.g., Oviatt v. Garretson,
note 4 supra: State ex rel. Sullivan v. Cross, (Mo. 1958) 314 S.W. (2d) 889; Plopa v.
DuPre, note 4 supra.
6 Generally courts cannot acquire jurisdiction over a foreign administrator even by
his consent or through personal service within the state. In re Estate or Thompson v.
Coyle &: Co., 339 Mo. 410, 97 S.W. (2d) 93 (1936); Burrowes v. Goodman, (2d Cir. 1931)
50 F. (2d) 92, cert. den. 284 U.S. 650 (1931); Judy v. Kelley, 11 Ill. 211 (1849); CoNFLict OF
LAws llEsTATEMENT §513 (1934). But cf. Lawrence v. Nelson, 143 U.S. 215 (1892). Contra:
Lackner v. M'Kechney, (7th Cir. 1918) 252 F. 403; Laughlin &: McManus v. Solomon,
180 Pa. 177, 36 A. 704 (1897).
7Thorburn v. Gates, (S.D. N.Y. 1915) 225 F. 613; Wilson v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,
(8th Cir. 1908) 164 F. 817; McDOWELL, FOREIGN PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES 83 (1957).
8 Vaughn v. Northrup, 15 Pet. (40 U.S.) 1 (1841); Appeal of Gantt, 286 App. Div.
212, 141 N.Y.S. (2d) 738 (1955); Hargrave v. Turner Lumber Co., 194 La. 285, 193 S. 648
(1940): Jefferson v. Beall, 117 Ala. 436, 23 s. 44 (1897): CoNFLicr OF LAWS RESTATEMENT
§512 (1934). But see Johnson v. Jackson, 56 Ga. 326 (1876). See generally GOODRICH, CoNFLicr OF LAws, 3d ed., §190 (1949).
9 Thorburn v. Gates, note 7 supra; Feldman v. Gross, (N.D. Ohio 1952) 106 F. Supp.
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on the ground that the statute violates due process by asserting jurisdiction where none can be acquired.10 One court has so held.11 But it has
been suggested that the exercise of jurisdiction in this type situation is
not unconstitutional because the immunity rule is not jurisdictional in
nature but is a rule of comity based on the convenience of administering
estates. 12 This contention, however, goes against the established weight of
authority13 and has not been seized upon by the courts to sustain the
statutes.14 Most courts have recognized the rule as jurisdictional and then
asserted jurisdiction in spite of it. The same practical considerations
which underlie basic nonresident motorist statutes would seem to demand
such holdings. The power of a state to provide a forum for suit against
negligent nonresident motorists for the protection and convenience of its
citizens can no longer be questioned.15 Where death results from the
accident, an even clearer case for the assumption of jurisdiction is presented. The immunity rule developed at a time when society was not
faced with the problems of mass mobility and destruction created by the
automobile. It is not fitted to meet our present needs in this respect and
should therefore be treated as inapplicable in the restricted nonresident
motorist setting. Although not expressly stated, this is in effect the view
that the courts sustaining the statutes have taken. The reasoning of the
instant case is typical. The court makes no extended analysis of the conventional jurisdictional defects. It simply states that the rule of limited
territorial capacity must yield to the police power of the state in control
of its highways.1a
The principal case leaves open the question whether the foreign
judgment will be given full faith and credit in the domiciliary state
when it is presented there as a claim against the estate.17 Courts in the
past have uniformly refused to give effect to a judgment rendered in
another state against a domestic administrator on the ground that his

308; Helme v. Buckelew, 229 N.Y. 363, 128 N.E. 216 (1920). See also CONFLICT OF LAWS
REsrATEMENT §514 (1934). Contra: Dewey v. Barnhouse, 75 Kan. 214, 88 P. 877 (1907);
Craig v. Toledo, A.A. &: N.M.R. Co., 2 Ohio N.P. 64 (1895).

10 For an excellent discussion of the application of the general rule of immunity to
a statute of the type under discussion see comment, 36 IowA L. REv. 128 (1950).
11 Knoop v. Anderson, note 4 supra.
12 McDOWELL, FOREIGN PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES 119 (1957): comment, 57 YALE L. J.
647 at 652 (1948); Culp, "Recent Developments in Actions Against Nonresident Motorists,"
37 Mica. L. REv. 58 at 73 (1938).
13 See generally 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS §512.1 (1935). See also the cases cited in
note 9 supra in which statutes purporting to give jurisdiction over foreign personal
representatives were invalidated. The courts so holding felt the rule was jurisdictional.
14 The principal case, at 894, recognizes this as a possible analysis when it quotes
from 57 YALE L. J. 647 at 652, note 12 supra. But the court does not predicate its holding
on this theorv.
15 Hess v.' Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
16 Principal case at 895.
17 Principal case at 894.
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immunity to suit outside the state of his appointment deprived the sister
state court of jurisdiction.18 Should this corollary to the general immunity
rule be followed here, it is likely any judgment rendered in the present
case would have to be relitigated in Nebraska to be enforced against the
estate. This result could be avoided through recognition by Nebraska that
in the nonresident motorist situation there is a legitimate basis for the
exercise by Missouri of jurisdiction over a Nebraska administratrix. Thus
the reason for denying full faith and credit disappears. If there is sufficient
connection with the state to sustain jurisdiction as a matter of due process, the requirements of full faith and credit in this respect are also met.19
As more states amend their nonresident motorist statutes to encompass
personal representatives, the more likely it is that full faith and credit
will be given, whether required or not. A court which upholds the validity
of such a statute will find itself in an anomalous position if it refuses to
recognize judgments rendered under a similar statute in another state.20
On the other hand, the full faith and credit question may in fact never
arise. As a practical matter, if the deceased nonresident carried liability
insurance, any judgment obtained may voluntarily be paid by the insurer.
Even if the judgment is not paid, if the insurer is licensed to do business
within the state the policy might be held to constitute an asset within the
state for which ancillary administration may be granted.21 Missouri then
could enforce its own judgment.22
Thomas E. Kauper

18 Judy v. Kelley, note 6 supra; In re Estate of Thompson v. Coyle &: Co., note 6
supra; York v. Bank of Commerce &: Trust Co., 19 Tenn. App. 594, 93 S.W. (2d) 333
(1935); In re Cowham's Estate, 220 Mich. 560, 190 N.W. 680 (1922); CONFLICT OF LAws
REsTATEMENT §514 (1934). See generally McDOWELL, FOREIGN PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES
85, 103-104 (1957).
19 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Riverside &: Dan River Cotton Mills v.
Menefee, 237 U.S. 189 (1915). See CONFUCT OF LAws REsTATEMENT §42 (1934).
20 Since Nebraska has enacted a statute of this type, Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943; re-issue
1956) §25-530, but has not yet passed on its validity, it would be confronted with a difficult question if the judgment in the principal case is presented there for full faith and
credit.
21 In re Estate of Rogers, 164 Kan. 492, 190 P. (2d) 857 (1948); Furst v. Brady, 375
Ill. 425, 31 N.E. (2d) 606 (1940); Gordon v. Shea, 300 Mass. 95, 14 N.E. (2d) 105 (1938).
Contra, In re Roche, 16 N.J. 579, 109 A. (2d) 655 (1954).
22 The court in the principal case, at 895, recognizes that the presence of liability
insurance might make it unnecessary to present the claim in Nebraska, but it does not
state whether this is because there might be voluntary payment or because ancillary
administration might be granted.

